Uncertainty and god: A Jamesian pragmatist approach to uncertainty and ignorance in science and religion by Petersen, AC
UNCERTAINTY AND GOD: A JAMESIAN PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE IN
SCIENCE AND RELIGION
by Arthur Petersen
Abstract. This article picks up from William James’s pragmatism
and metaphysics of experience, as expressed in his “radical empiri-
cism,” and further develops this Jamesian pragmatist approach to
uncertainty and ignorance by connecting it to phenomenological
thought. The Jamesian pragmatist approach avoids both a “crude
naturalism” and an “absolutist rationalism,” and allows for identifi-
cation of intimations of the sacred in both scientific and religious
practices—which all, in their respective ways, try to make sense of
a complex world. Analogous to religious practices, emotion and the
metaphysics of experience play a central role in science, especially the
emotion of wonder. Engaging in scientific or religious practices may
create opportunities for individuals to realize that they are co-creators
of the world in partnership with God, in full awareness of uncertainty
and ignorance and filled with the emotion of wonder.
Keywords: complexity; emotion; ignorance; William James; meta-
physics; phenomenology; pragmatism; religion; science; uncertainty;
wonder
Science and religion are very different types of human practices. Science
is about understanding human and nonhuman nature without invoking
God, and religion is about relating to God. In this article, I explore what
scientific and religious practices can have in common, when viewed from
the perspective of the American philosopher William James (1842–1910).
I am specifically interested here in the roles of emotion and the metaphysics
of experience in characterizing both types of practices. How do emotion
and the metaphysics of experience—and corresponding intimations of the
sacred—relate to the irreducible uncertainty and ignorance that character-
ize both science and religion? And what does this imply for the relationship
between uncertainty and God?
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James is a particularly interesting thinker with respect to the role of
uncertainty and ignorance in both science and religion. As Paul Jerome
Croce (1995) has shown, the young James closely witnessed at Harvard
transitions in American intellectual life from scientific and religious beliefs
held with certainty to belief based on uncertainty. In science, particularly
the implicit probabilism of Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection
set the stage for this transition. In religion, the stage for transition was set
by liberal Protestant thought.
James saw the building of relations between science and religion as
a subtle task: theology should take science seriously, but not become a
“crude naturalism” (James [1907] 1995, 116). James pointed out that
his pragmatist philosophy, which he himself termed “radical empiricism,”
could act as mediator between science and religion. According to David
Lamberth, “James . . . seeks a philosophy that both can account for the
practical successes of the sciences and can value and provide insight into
our moral and religious sentiments and experiences, as well as our basic
sense of life” (Lamberth 1999, 186). I contend that at the same time, such
a philosophy can address intimations of the sacred—including intimations
of God—in scientific practices.
In order to elucidate how a Jamesian pragmatist approach could work
in the context of current understandings of scientific and religious prac-
tices, I make use of David Lamberth’s (1999) interpretation of James’s
metaphysics of experience. I also make connection to recent discussions of
interpreting James in the context of science-and-religion. Subsequently, I
feature several phenomenological accounts (Lonergan 1957; Miller 1992;
Letiche, Lissack, and Schultz 2011; de Knijff 2013) that are consistent
with Jamesian pragmatism in relevant respects, and which allow for the
development of a more fine-grained approach. I continue the article with
applying the developed Jamesian pragmatist approach in analyses of the
role of emotion and the metaphysics of experience vis-a`-vis uncertainty
and ignorance in scientific practices (using examples from natural science)
and in religious practices (using examples from liturgical ritual). Finally, I
briefly summarize an answer to the question on the relationship between
uncertainty and God.
JAMES’S PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO THE METAPHYSICS OF
EXPERIENCE
For the purpose of introducing James’s work from the perspective of what
he had to say about metaphysics and religion, I here make use of David
Lamberth’s (1999) study William James and the Metaphysics of Experience.
There has been—and still is—a bias in the reception of James toward
his work in psychology, which is not surprising given James’s background
and given his approach to philosophy. James is a founding father of the
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discipline of psychology, especially through the publication of his Principles
of Psychology in 1890. At Harvard University, he had first been appointed as
a professor of psychology, from 1889 to 1896, before he was reappointed
as a professor of philosophy in 1897. James’s metaphysics had reached its
initial form already in the mid-1890s and was published in its most elab-
orated form in A Pluralistic Universe in 1909 (James’s Hibbert Lectures to
Manchester College, Oxford in 1908). Lamberth offers an enriched inter-
pretation of James’s most famous work,The Varieties of Religious Experience,
which was published in 1902 (James’s Gifford Lectures to the University of
Edinburgh in 1901–1902). He furthermore shows how James’s book Prag-
matism, published in 1907 (James’s Lowell Lectures to the Lowell Institute,
Boston in 1906), contains important clues on his metaphysics.
Lamberth summarizes James’s composite philosophical worldview as
follows:
The components to be distinguished are: (1) the methodological thesis (or
postulate) of radical empiricism that only, and yet all, experienceable con-
structions be admitted in philosophy; (2) the factual thesis of radical empiri-
cism that relations are themselves a part of experience; (3) the metaphysical
thesis of pure experience; (4) the functional doctrine of direct acquaintance,
or immediate knowing; (5) the functional account of knowledge about, or
conceptual knowing; . . . (6) the pragmatic conception of truth . . . [and]
(7) the thesis of pluralistic panpsychism. (Lamberth 1999, 14)
First, the methodological thesis of radical empiricism implies an oppo-
sition to rationalism and a methodological approach that starts with parts
instead of the whole of being, and thus emphasizes particularity and con-
comitant fallibility of conceptual entities. The “radical” flavor of James’s
empiricism derives from his insistence that no element that is directly expe-
rienced may be excluded from constructions. And in practice, says James
(who is here benefitting from his background as psychologist), people
do not experience the absolute—which is a rationalist construction—but
rather “[w]e humans are incurably rooted in the temporal point of view”
(James 1909, 40) and—highlighting the pluralism inherent in his radical
empiricism—“a disseminated, distributed, or incompletely unified appear-
ance” (James 1909, 44) is the most that may be achieved in experience; an
experience, however, that is much fuller and wider than a crude naturalism
would have it.
Second, the factual thesis of radical empiricism leads philosophy to con-
sider the relations that connect experiences to be themselves experienced
and thus as “real” as anything else in the system. Against rationalist phi-
losophy with its impracticable ideas, James argues that “[e]very examiner
of the sensible life in concreto must see that relations of every sort, of time,
space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as in-
tegral members of the sensational flux as terms are” (James 1909, 279).
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According to James, it is implausible that all the differentiations of relation
could be produced by the mind, rather than be part of the object as any
other quality of content.
Third, the metaphysical thesis of pure experience argues against
thought/thing and mind/matter dualisms. “Pure experience” is consid-
ered by James to be the one primal stuff that exists in the world, and
knowing (and consciousness) can then be understood as relations between
thought and thing, mind and matter, subject and object, while remaining
aware that the words “thought,” “thing,” and so on only signify aspects of
pure experience and should not be taken as dualisms. Pure experience thus
serves as a monistic metaphysical substratum.
Fourth, the functional doctrine of direct acquaintance refers to discrete
pure experience treated epistemologically, which admits of an immediate
cognitive relation between two collectives of pure experience. James offers
an example of the particular experience of sitting in a room: in the immedi-
ate pure experience the two contexts of an individual’s personal biography
and the history of the house containing the room conjoin. In this case, the
subject has direct acquaintance with the object. Phenomenologically this
function of direct acquaintance can be described as knowledge that lacks
mediation by concepts. This knowledge is not automatically made valid by
its immediacy. There is a fundamental potential indeterminacy that leads
to novelty and surprises. All experiences are potentially indeterminate with
respect to truth (see below).
Fifth, the functional account of “knowledge about” concerns external
relations of conjunction, pure experiences that functionally connect dis-
crete pure experiences. Phenomenologically, “knowledge about” involves
discrete experiences leading one to another serially and terminating in a
final discrete experience. James’s focus on the termini, or endpoints, of this
dynamic allows him to explicate the philosophical notion of “representa-
tion” as one of “substitution”:
While functions of knowing can be distinguished according both to their
starting points and the paths of conjunction they follow, the most important
similarity and dissimilarity they have depends on their termini. The fact that
two functional chains of intermediaries share the same terminus makes them
functionally similar, and that functional similarity, on James’s view, allows
for substitution: one chain for another. . . . The most important case of
substitution in human life, James thinks, is the substitution of conceptual
paths for perceptual ones. (Lamberth 1999, 47)
Concepts—even though they are ultimately all fallible (see below)—can
thus serve a useful purpose. In James’s words: “We come back into the
concrete from our journey into these abstractions, with an increase both of
vision and power” (James 1909, 217). One should not underestimate the
potential useful power of concepts.
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Sixth, the pragmatic conception of truth follows from James’s radical
empiricism. Against the presence of “an absolute mind that makes the
partial facts by thinking them” (James 1909, 36), James posits a distributive
form of reality which does not need an all-knower to hold the world
together. Verification of truth can in principle only be done by referring to
an available pure experience, thus by referring to a practice. Even though
truth cannot be directly verified, something like “trueness” can be assessed
in terms of success: “one must evaluate the concrete success . . . an idea has
in serving as denkmittel through the world of pure experience” (Lamberth
1999, 53). One cannot do this alone: “On James’s view truth and the
process of establishing it is social, . . . most basically because reality itself—
including the knowers and the known, concepts and objects, and the
true and the real—is social in the most fundamental and human senses”
(Lamberth 1999, 57). The sociality of pragmatism’s understanding of truth
takes a central position in James’s radical empiricism.
Finally, the thesis of pluralistic panpsychism builds on the lack of need
for an all-knowing mind or infinite God to maintain the individuality and
specificity of elements in reality. Instead, James proposes a pluralistic and
nondualistic version of the claim of panpsychism that all objects have an
inner, psychical aspect. In A Pluralistic Universe, James writes:
Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it [the universe] is
many means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally related.
Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic
view a genuinely “external” environment of some sort or amount. (James
1909, 321, emphasis in original)
A corollary is that, while James’s philosophy permits of a superhuman
consciousness, this cannot be an all-knower in its absolute form but will be
an almost all-knower with an external environment and will be finite. Such
a God, according to James, may be at odds with rationalist philosophy
but is much more congruent with religious experience. A further corollary
is that due to the fundamental openness of experience and hence of the
world, “James’s pluralism is able to leave open theoretical space for real,
factual novelty (which comes about all the same), such as that found in new
scientific discoveries, new or unexpected experiences (for example, religious
experiences), and even the inexhaustible wealth of detail in any given
bit of pure experience” (Lamberth 1999, 195). From this fundamental
openness, the present article develops as its main theme that wonder can
be permanently encountered in both scientific and religious practices.
Lamberth (1999) does not describe James’s theory of emotion. For that
purpose I rely on Jeremy Carrette (2008), who argues for a three-stage
picture of James’s theory of emotion, which is consistent with Lamberth’s
interpretation of James. “Stages” here refer to the development of James’s
thought. Stage one (James’s “organic theory”) focuses on the “coarser” or
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“standard” emotions. Without doubt the central basis of James’s theory of
emotion is grounded in the body. Stage two (James’s “cognitive theory”)
deals with the “subtler” or “complex” emotions, which are related to moral,
intellectual, spiritual (mental), and aesthetic dimensions of life. Stage three
(James’s “social theory”) refers to the “religious” and “metaphysical” emo-
tions. These three types of emotion (as described by three theories) can
occur in combination, that is, a social emotion can have cognitive and
organic emotions associated with it.
Given these interpretations of James by Lamberth and Carrette, I now
turn to three recent discussions of William James in the pages of Zygon
(Watts 1997; Taves 2009; Crockett 2012).
While Fraser Watts (1997) interprets James unfavorably as a biological
reductionist with respect to emotions (since according to James, feelings
arise from the perception of biological changes), he makes use of James’s
The Varieties of Religious Experience ([1902] 2012) to argue that “emotion
. . . may be a rather good analogue of religion” (Watts 1997, 248). In
assessing the critical reception of The Varieties of Religious Experience in
theology, Watts identifies the need to account for the role of cognition
in the genesis of religious feelings, and he also adds that James’s earlier
psychological work would allow for such an interpretation of The Varieties
of Religious Experience: “Though this emphasis is lessmarked inTheVarieties
of Religious Experience than it might be, James would presumably have had
no difficulty in recasting what he said there so as to reflect more adequately
his general theoretical position” (Watts 1997, 249). My contention is that
Lamberth’s interpretation of James does precisely that and therewith meets
Watts’s concerns: relations to cognitive elements can be—and in most
cases will be—involved in people’s pure experience. Thus James’s notion of
religious experience can be seen to be in line with contemporary theories
of emotions.
Ann Taves (2009) remarks on the various extant interpretations of
James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience, citing also Lamberth’s (1999),
that most of these have missed that writing it was a religious act for James:
[T]hose of us in the academy who have attempted to read it for our own
purposes—philosophical, mystical, or scientific—have mostly missed the
point. The bigger story, and one that many of his nonacademic readers have
grasped, is [the] shift from the other world to this world, from life after
death to self-transformation aided by higher powers. (Taves 2009, 430)
Still, I would maintain that Lamberth’s interpretation of The Varieties of
Religious Experience in light of James’smetaphysics gives us a philosophically
useful interpretation that, while acknowledging the complexities of James’s
book, can assist us in better characterizing the relationship between science
and religion. For example, Lamberth stresses the importance ofA Pluralistic
Universe for interpreting The Varieties of Religious Experience and in A
814 Zygon
Pluralistic Universe one can clearly sense James’s personal frustration with
his contemporary Church and its theism: “An external creator and his
institutions may still be verbally confessed at Church in formulas that
linger by their mere inertia, but the life is out of them, we avoid dwelling
on them, the sincere heart of us is elsewhere” (James 1909, 30). On the
positive side, James is very sympathetic toward those who know “that we
inhabit an invisible spiritual environment from which help comes, our
souls being mysteriously one with a larger soul whose instruments we are”
(James 1909, 308). Indeed, for James it is all about saving experiences and
intimacy with God, versus the theistic view of humans being outsiders and
mere subjects to God.
Finally, Larry Crockett (2012) laments the minor role played by prag-
matism in the half century and more of the science-and-religion dialogue.
He returns to James as an “unintentional fountainhead in the history of
thought”:
One line of thought from James to Whitehead to Barbour culminates in
critical realism; another from James to Dewey to Rorty culminates in a
quasi-relativistic neopragmatism. Thus, James’s writings issued in exactly
the kind of bifurcation he strove to avoid. (Crockett 2012, 393)
This argument is well taken; taking the Jamesian pragmatist approach
seriously goes against both positivism and relativism. I here give Crockett’s
overall assessment of Jamesian pragmatism:
Pragmatism notably holds out the promise of mitigating the conflicts of
the many religions that humanity has embraced. Pragmatism in theology
tempers the presumption of the theologian who imagines the mind of God
is readily amenable to theological representations; therefore, pragmatism
intentionally subverts the dogmatically doctrinal as notably unhelpful to
community conversations. Pragmatism in natural science means our con-
cepts are more akin to Darwinian species that have no essentialist definition
but are frankly recognized as conceptual species whose pertinence to the
problems we wish to solve will have a profound history. Pragmatism should
reign in the dialogically inhibiting presumption of both positivist science
and dogmatic religion that are the source of much of the historic tension.
In general terms, therefore, pragmatism offers the prospect of a robust
dialogue that should stimulate both our understanding and our civility.
(Crockett 2012, 410–11)
In a manner consistent with Lamberth’s interpretation, Crockett engages
fruitfully with the whole body of James’s work, including his A Pluralistic
Universe, in the context of object-oriented programming.
Having arrived now at a somewhat fuller picture of Jamesian
pragmatism, I endeavor in the following to connect James to a
third line of thought, that of phenomenology. Here James cannot
be considered the “fountainhead.” But the line of phenomenological
thought from Heidegger onwards shows remarkable similarities to the
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phenomenological implications of James’s metaphysics, in particular when
we focus on uncertainty and ignorance. In the introduction to James’s
pragmatist approach given in this section, for the two components of
knowing—that is, immediate knowing and conceptual knowing—I al-
ready included Lamberth’s phenomenological accounts. Immediate know-
ing (direct acquaintance) lacks mediation by concepts and conceptual
knowing (knowledge about) involves the substitution of conceptual paths
of conjunction for perceptual ones. Since any bit of pure experience con-
tains an inexhaustible wealth of detail and knowing, according to James’s
pluralism, and has to leave open space for factual novelty, it is worth-
while to further develop this aspect of uncertainty and ignorance. In the
next section, I demonstrate that phenomenological thought is fit for this
task.
UNCERTAINTY AND IGNORANCE IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL
THOUGHT
Uncertainty and ignorance are key in phenomenological descriptions of
both science and religion. In science, the complexity of the world over-
whelms us humans. In religion, the situation is similar. Building on the
phenomenological philosophies of Martin Heidegger ([1927] 1962) and
Bernard Lonergan ([1957] 1992), Jerome Miller’s (1992) In the Throe of
Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Post-Modern World delves into the
philosophical depth of the experience of the unknown:
[P]hilosophy requires us to recognize as unknown precisely the familiar
which we thought we knew. At the very beginning it situates us in the
middle of a whole which we know only as wholly unknown. . . . Because
the unknown is not assimilatable into the given, we can become aware of it
as unknown only by acknowledging its difference, and the impossibility of
homologizing its otherness with what we have heretofore thought of as the
already known. (Miller 1992, 3)
Such a philosophy takes James’s antiabsolutism very seriously. While con-
cepts may prove to be useful in practice, they should always be considered
fallible, especially when one journeys among abstractions.
One of the central concepts of phenomenological thought is “being.”
In Jamesian terms, I propose that “being” can be understood as “pure
experience.” By taking a closer phenomenological look at wonder, one can
begin to grasp both the fullness of pure experience and its fundamental
potential indeterminacy. Lonergan describes the phenomenon of wonder
as follows:
One may wonder just how all-inclusive being is. That wonder may be
formulated in a variety of manners. But no matter how it is formulated,
no matter whether it can be formulated, it can serve only to show how
all-inclusive being is. For the wonder is inquiry. It is the desire to know.
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Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion
of being. (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 375)
Wonder is a motivating force in a variety of practices of inquiry.
Wonder is emotional; wonder provokes “the eros of the mind” (Miller
1992, 8). The emotion of wonder is not limited to deep philosophical or
religious wonder, but includes the wonder that drives any kind of inquiry
and that may ultimately result in insight and judgment:
Insight comes as a release to the tension of inquiry. . . . Deep within us
all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to
know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause,
to explain. (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 28)
The creative tension caused by wonder, when released, causes the emotion
of joy (see also the next section). Following James’s theory of emotion, the
emotions of wonder and joy have organic, cognitive and—in the case of,
for example, religious or metaphysical wonder and joy—social dimensions
(including, for example, social relations with the community and with the
sacred).
It cannot be planned when the tension of inquiry gets released, since
“insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly” (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 29).
Similar to the fallibility assumption of pragmatism, Lonergan holds that
insight is fallible:
The formulations of understanding yield concepts, definitions, objects of
thought, suppositions, considerations. . . . [S]uch formulations are, of them-
selves, just hypotheses: they may be accurate or inaccurate, correct or mis-
taken; and to pronounce upon them is the work of reflection and judgment.
(Lonergan [1957] 1992, 298–99)
Then—in apparent contrast with pragmatism—Lonergan seems to imply
that the faculty of judgment should be able to ultimately deal with the
fallibility of insight, by answering the question “But is it so?”:
Judgments are personal commitments to a yes or no; both answers cannot
be given to the same question; and under ideal conditions either one of the
two answers has to be given. (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 302)
Still, Lonergan does keep open the possibility that no definite answer can
be given:
When there is no preponderance of evidence in favor of either affirmation
or denial [of insight], we can only acknowledge our ignorance. But between
these extremes there is a series of intermediate positions, and probable
judgments are their outcome. (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 324)
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So, in between the extremes of certainty and ignorance we have uncertainty
and judgment can only be “probable” without having the statistical means
at our disposal to determine an objective probability.
We find that Lonergan finally arrives at a pragmatist conclusion on
the basis of our knowing: “The ultimate basis of our knowing is not
necessity but contingent fact, and the fact is established, not prior to our
engagement in knowing, but simultaneously with it” (Lonergan [1957]
1992, 356). One can only find out truth “pragmatically by engaging one
in the process” (Lonergan [1957] 1992, 356).
Since Lonergan’s analysis of insight and judgment largely neglects won-
der about social worlds (remembering also that for James religious and
metaphysical emotions are social), I also discuss a phenomenological ap-
proach that focuses on social reality. Hugo Letiche et al. (2011) have
developed a social complexity theory which systematizes the fundamen-
tal tension between “experienced/emergent coherence” and “homologies”
(structural principles of similarity in reality with generative power). Their
method of systematizing the interrelationship between these two concepts
is to consider them as two corners mirrored around the center of a “semiotic
square,” with two other concepts, those of “attributed/ascribed coherence”
and “affordances” (possibilities presented to existence), occupying the other
two corners. The distinction between experienced and attributed coher-
ence is the following: “[e]xperienced coherence is direct, context bound
and immediate; attributed coherence is categorical, defined, labeled, and
mediated” (Letiche et al. 2011, 8–9).
Affordances stand opposed to experienced coherence: “[a]ffordances in-
vite, demand, and assert an attraction on the subject . . . [and] entail
circumstance(s) acting on consciousness or world presenting itself as pos-
sibilities and opportunities” (Letiche et al. 2011, 9). This should not be
interpreted as dualism, but as a dynamic relationship between self (ex-
perienced coherence) and world (affordances). Before applying this new
terminology to address the question on uncertainty and God, I connect it
to Jamesian pragmatism.
The analogue for the dynamics of experienced/emergent coherence and
affordances in James’s pragmatist approach is the double-barreled nature
of “pure experience.” Experienced/emergent coherence and affordances
are related to each other and their relationship is directly experienced in
pure experience. Experienced/emergent coherence in Jamesian terms is
a combination of “direct acquaintance” and “knowledge about,” where
the latter is still closely tied to the direct context and thus not too
abstract. Attributed coherence corresponds to the more abstract forms of
“knowledge about.” Affordances and homologies resemble one another
in that they both have to do with world and how reality asserts itself,
while experienced and attributed coherence resemble one another in that
they both have to do with experiences of order, unity, and meaning.
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Experienced coherence and affordances are directly perceived (“first order
phenomena,” the Jamesian pure experience) and refer to individual
consciousness and to particular possibility, while attributed coherence and
homologies are indirectly perceived (“second order phenomena,” further
removed from the Jamesian experience) and refer to collective or shared
signification and to sameness (Letiche et al. 2011, 9, 20–21).
According to Letiche et al. (2011), “human knowing (probably) falls
short of being able to be sure about homologies” (Letiche et al. 2011,
9). This implies deep uncertainty in the cognizance of homologies. For
models of God for instance, a Jamesian analysis would urge that these
models are not themselves to be conflated with the transcendent. Still,
we do need attributed coherence to think about homologies such as God.
Letiche et al. (2011) describe the crucial role that is played by homologies:
Affordances invite perception, action, and sometimes just doing nothing.
Homologies are archetypes of structure that tie aspects of experience together
via simulacra. . . . Homologies link experience to higher order awareness;
neither aggregation level is truer than the other. . . . If we want to think
emergence’s possibilities, we need higher order principles to do it. (Letiche
et al. 2011, 237)
The distinction between attributed coherence and homologies is important
for Jamesian thought; higher-level conceptions, such as those of God, can
be useful and even significant, as long as there is not an overreliance on
them.
So we may experience coherence in intimations of the sacred, and at-
tributed coherence may play a role at the back of our minds, but if we
become very specific about for instance models of God then we inevitably
get further removed from experience and substantiation in experience be-
comes virtually impossible. This also holds for James’s model of God.
Where James criticizes the theistic conception of God on the basis that it
does not connect with religious experiences, he portrays God as “intimate
soul and reason of the universe” (James 1909, 28), “the indwelling divine”
(James 1909, 30) and as “finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in
both at once” (James 1909, 311). So in James’s model of God, God is not
all-powerful and all-knowing, but still this God—whom we can intimate,
who is Other, but who is continuous with us—can show us “a world in
which all is well, in spite of certain forms of death, indeed because of certain
forms of death” (James 1909, 305, emphasis in original). Individuals can
intimate the sacred through pure experience that features affordances and
experienced/emergent coherence, while they can collectively share such in-
timations through attributed coherence, for which it is uncertain how well
it captures the underlying homology.
As a final example of phenomenological thought, I mention Hans de
Knijff ’s (2013) study on the fundamental distinction between the natural
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sciences and the humanities. De Knijff defends the correlation between
“subject knowledge” and “object knowledge,” and takes exception—
against many popular cognitive scientists—to the Cartesian split between
consciousness and body. His description of the “soul,” considered as a
“medial process that encompasses subject and object, self-creates world
and attracts world” (de Knijff, 232, my translation), seems to me to be
fully consistent with James’s metaphysics.
WONDER AND INTIMATIONS OF THE SACRED IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICES
Having laid the groundwork for a developed Jamesian pragmatist approach,
let us here first consider wonder and intimations of the sacred in scientific
practices. For that purpose, I indeed analyze science as a practice instead
of a set of beliefs. Thomas Kuhn in his seminal 1962 book The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions radically criticized then-philosophical views
of science. Joseph Rouse (1987, 30–40) shows how radical Kuhn’s turn
was by providing an interpretation of that book which emphasizes scien-
tific practices at the expense of scientific beliefs. For instance: “Paradigms
are not primarily agreed-upon theoretical commitments but exemplary
ways of conceptualizing and intervening in particular empirical contexts”
(Rouse 1987, 30). Kuhn had replaced representing and observing with
“constructing, tinkering, and noticing as exemplars of scientific practice”
(Rouse 1987, 40).
Scientific practice is beset with uncertainty and ignorance:
All paradigms confront obstacles (anomalies) at all times. . . . The recognition
of anomalies is . . . an awareness that something significant is not understood
or not being dealt with adequately, but it is not yet a clear awareness of what
the problem is. . . . How scientists respond to such ambiguous difficulties
often depends upon whether the problems they present seem localizable.
(Rouse 1987, 32–33)
In the case a crisis ensues because the anomalies do not get resolved, the
intelligibility and reliability of many research practices and achievements
are placed in doubt:
[I]t is not that scientists do not know what to believe; scientists are profes-
sionally accustomed to uncertainty of that sort. It is that they are no longer
quite sure how to proceed: What investigations are worth undertaking,
which supposed facts are unreliable artefacts, what concepts or models are
useful guides for their theoretical or experimental manipulations? (Rouse
1987, 33–34, emphasis in original)
There are even direct parallels that can be drawn to religious conversion:
“Changing from one paradigm to another is not like a conversion to new
beliefs but is like a conversion to a new form of life” (Rouse 1987, 34).
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James’s metaphysics of experience, with its emphasis on fallibility and
practice, offers an interpretation of such a crisis situation as one where
the usability of concepts breaks down and, in phenomenological terms,
the attributed coherence of one scientist’s concept is pitted against that of
another.
As Rouse relates, science is a thoroughly communal activity:
[T]here are no generally applicable standards of rational acceptability in
science. There is only a roughly shared understanding of what can be as-
sumed, what can (or must) be argued for, and what is unacceptable for any
given purpose and context. Both purposes and contexts are quite varied and
undergo significant transformations over time. They reflect the judgments
of a community concerning what is credible and reliable in the context of
their ongoing work. (Rouse 1987, 124)
Also when there is no crisis scientists proceed not on the basis of what they
believe but on the basis of how they do things.
Now, emotion is central in all significant human activities, and I would
argue also in the core activities in the practice of science. However, par-
ticularly in science there is a suspicion of emotion, even though this has
not always been the case. Jack Barbalet (2004, 248–49) and others have
shown that in the early days of the scientific revolution passion played a
central role in the performance of science. Scientists were explicit that they
were overcome by emotional turmoil caused by the puzzlement they ex-
perienced, arising from their extraordinary curiosity. In their writing they
narrated their surprises and related when they were at a loss in explaining
particular phenomena. According to Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park,
“[m]using admiration, startled wonder, then bustling curiosity—these were
the successive moments of seventeenth-century cliche´s describing how
the passions impelled and guided natural philosophical investigations”
(Daston and Park 2001, 303). What was discussed above about the emo-
tions of wonder and joy—and about insight coming as a release to the
tension of inquiry—plays a role here too. The emotions of uncertainty and
anxious curiosity can only be cured by scientific engagement and finding
explanations.
From the late eighteenth century, Francis Bacon’s early seventeenth
century counterposition—that for science to proceed all emotions must be
expelled from all scientific activities, not only from the communication of
science—became dominant. However, from analysis of scientific practice,
Michael Polanyi has concluded that “[s]cientific passions are no mere
psychological by-product, but have a logical function which contributes
an indispensable element to science” (Polanyi [1958] 1998, 134). Positive
passions affirm that something is precious. According to Polanyi, “[t]he
excitement of the scientist making a discovery is an intellectual passion,
telling that something is intellectually precious and, more particularly, that
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it is precious to science” (Polanyi [1958] 1998, 134, emphasis in original).
Emotion serves “as a guide in the assessment of what is of higher and what
of lesser interest; what is great in science, andwhat relatively slight” (Polanyi
[1958] 1998, 135). This appreciation “depends ultimately on a sense of
intellectual beauty” (Polanyi [1958] 1998, 135). So, indeed emotion plays
a central role in scientific practice.
When a correspondence is attained between the values of the scientific
thought collective and the particular conditions encountered in research,
this “evokes the emotions of joy, delight and pleasure” (Barbalet 2004, 269).
Making reference to the work of Joseph De Rivera, Barbalet concludes
that this joy “is precipitated as a feeling of self-actualization and of the
meaningfulness of one’s activities, indeed being” and that “[i]n this regard,
joy and wonder are parallel emotions” (Barbalet 2004, 269). Thus the
emotion of wonder in science, which may result in the emotion of joy, is
a “metaphysical emotion” in sense of James’s social theory of emotion (see
above) and can lead to intimations of the sacred.
The cognitive referent of metaphysical emotion, the appreciation of
beauty for instance, can thus reside inmatching scientific values. In physics,
an example of such values could be the following: “Scientific values consist
in the continual and increasing recognition of the uniformity of nature”
(Chandrasekhar 1987, 4). With respect to the motivation of scientists,
Chandrasekhar reject[s] “the view that the motivation springs from a con-
scious or subconscious belief that everything he does will eventually find
use in the amenities of daily life” (Chandrasekhar 1987, 12–13). But he
“also do[es] not accept the view that scientists are urged on in their work
by a ‘holy passion’ for truth or a ‘burning curiosity’ to unravel the ‘secrets’
of nature” (Chandrasekhar 1987, 13). In Chandrasekhar’s view, scientists
are attracted to elegance in theorizing. He adds:
What actually does give substance and reality to the efforts of a scientist is his
desire to participate actively in the progress of his science to the best of his
ability. And if I have to describe in one word what is the prime motive which
underlies a scientist’s work, I would say systematization. (Chandrasekhar
1987, 13)
Only “people who are acquainted with the subject have no difficulty in
recognizing or appreciating” the scientist’s contribution, just like beauty
in art cannot be defined (Chandrasekhar 1987, 13). Chandrasekhar has
come to the conclusion that
The motives of the individual scientists . . . are as varied as the tastes,
the temperaments, and the attitudes of the scientists themselves. Besides,
their motivations are subject to substantial changes during the lifetimes
of the scientists; indeed, it is difficult to discern a common denominator.
(Chandrasekhar 1987, 15)
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And he asks the following questions:
After a scientist has reached maturity, what are the reasons for his continued
pursuit of science? To what extent are they personal? To what extent are aes-
thetic criteria, like the perception of order and pattern, form and substance,
relevant? Are such aesthetic and personal criteria exclusive? Has a sense of
obligation a role? I do not mean obligation with the common meaning
of obligation to one’s students, one’s colleagues, and one’s community. I
mean, rather, obligation to science itself. And what, indeed, is the content
of obligation in the pursuit of science for science? (Chandrasekhar 1987,
26, emphasis in original)
These are deep questions. For some scientists, the answers may be related
to intimations of the sacred.
For being able to intimate the sacred it is not necessary to hit on what will
be accepted as true by the scientific community. Chandrasekhar (1987, 21–
23) illustrates this with two episodes in Werner Heisenberg’s career. After
the laws of quantum mechanics had come to a sharp focus in his mind,
Heisenberg relates:
I was far too excited to sleep, and so, as a new day dawned, I made for the
southern tip of the island, where I had been longing to climb a rock jutting
out into the sea. I now did so without too much trouble, and waited for the
sun to rise. (Werner Heisenberg 1971, 61)
Some thirty years later Heisenberg’s ideas on particle physics were rejected,
but he had experienced similar excited emotions, which he explicitly con-
nected with the sacred:
That these interrelationships display, in all their mathematical abstraction,
an incredible degree of simplicity, is a gift we can only accept humbly.
Not even Plato could have believed them to be so beautiful. For these
interrelationships cannot be invented; they have been there since the creation
of the world. (quoted in Elisabeth Heisenberg 1984, 144)
And Heisenberg’s wife, Elisabeth Heisenberg, relates:
With smiling certainty, he once said to me: “I was lucky enough to look
over the good Lord’s shoulder while He was at work.” That was enough for
him, more than enough! It gave him great joy, and the strength to meet the
hostilities and misunderstandings he was subjected to in the world time and
again with equanimity, and not to be led astray. (Heisenberg 1984, 157)
Many examples—and counterexamples—can be given of intimations of
the sacred in relation to design in nature. It will be difficult to find a pattern,
however. A pragmatist approach will immediately give up on claiming to
grasp the complexity of nature in terms of an argument for design. As James
already wrote in 1907 about this argument: “[God’s] designs have grown
so fast as to be incomprehensible to us humans” (James [1907] 1995, 43).
We don’t really know what we mean when we talk about design. However,
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talk about design in nature can intimate the sacred: “‘Design,’ worthless
though it be as a mere rationalistic principle set above or behind things for
our admiration, becomes, if our faith concretes it into something theistic, a
term of promise” (James [1907] 1995, 44, emphasis in original). This shows
that James could support a position of “design without fixity,” which takes
seriously the emergence of complex designs from natural processes, rejects
both crude naturalism and an absolute designer-God with a fixed plan,
and supports faith in a more open and uncertain role in creation for a
loving God who is not all-powerful and all-knowing in the traditional
philosophical senses (see the last section).
Stephen Jay Gould ([1990] 2000), in his history of paleontological
discovery and interpretation in the Burgess Shale, describes “wonder” as
having two aspects: “[wonder] at the beauty of the organisms themselves,
and at the new view of life that they have inspired” (Gould [1990] 2000,
14). In the community of paleontologists, Gould finds a “joint love for
knowledge about the history of our wonderful life” (Gould [1990] 2000,
19). But he is not overwhelmed by a notion of design:
Wind back the tape of life to the early days of the Burgess Shale; let it play
again from an identical starting point, and the chance becomes vanishingly
small that anything like human intelligence would grace the replay. (Gould
[1990] 2000, 13–14)
In contrast with Gould, in the context of physics and astronomy a couple
of centuries earlier, Isaac Newton wrote in his Principia:
This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have
arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful
being. . . . He rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all.
(Newton [1713] 1999, 940)
Here we have hit on the theism that was so strongly opposed by James.
Concerning the issue of theism and design, let us take a brief look at
a contemporary philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, who asks whether science
offers positive support for theistic (Christian) belief (Plantinga 2011, 193–
264). Plantinga first notes the striking fact that several of the basic physical
constants must fall within very narrow limits for intelligent life to develop.
Depending on one’s beliefs, the coincidences can evoke different emotions
(or, depending on one’s emotions, this can evoke different beliefs). One
possible reaction—and this is Plantinga’s view—is “to see them as substan-
tiating the theistic claim that the universe has been created by a personal
God and as offering the material for a properly restrained theistic argu-
ment” (Plantinga 2011, 197). Plantinga proceeds to biological arguments
that can evoke the belief in design. With respect to “intelligent design,”
Plantinga’s impression is that the arguments for it are reasonably powerful,
but he concludes that “it is unclear that the difference in probability [for
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the presence of protein machines based on assuming either unguided or
guided evolution] is sufficient to constitute serious support for the exis-
tence of an intelligent designer.” While probabilistic reasoning may not be
able on its own to support guided evolution, Plantinga holds that there are
other warrants for that theistic belief.
Plantinga’s (2011, 265–303) approach to the deep concord between
science and (Christian) religion offers interesting entry points into de-
scribing the role of emotion in science and religion. Plantinga’s view that
science will be successful only if the laws of nature are not too complex,
or deep, or otherwise beyond us, fits well with theistic religion and its
doctrine of man as the image of God. Furthermore, he argues with re-
spect to mathematical objects, such as numbers and sets, that they fit
very neatly into a theistic way of looking at the world. “Science is at
bottom an attempt to learn important truths about ourselves and our
world” (Plantinga 2011, 267) and “there is a match between our cogni-
tive or intellectual faculties and reality, thought of as including whatever
exists, a match that enables us to know something, indeed a great deal,
about the world—and also about ourselves and God himself ” (Plantinga
2011, 269). Some atheist thinkers would consider this just “blind luck,”
while others would account for natural emergence of order and complexity
probabilistically.
But what do we make of this from a pragmatist perspective? For this
I first turn to Mikael Leidenhag (2013), with whom I agree that the
inference made by religious naturalists (e.g., Stuart Kauffman 2007;
GordonD. Kaufman 2007) from the scientific concept of emergence to the
religious significance of nature (or some aspect of nature)—for example,
as a religious object worthy of worship or devotion—is problematic if it
entails the ontological thesis that there are independently existing religious
aspects of the natural order, labeled “God” or “creativity” (Leidenhag
2013, 974). But I do think that religious naturalists rightly emphasize
the existential value of uncertainty and ignorance with respect to the
complexity of the cosmological and evolutionary process. Humans here
encounter many unresolvable mysteries, which call for the emotion of
wonder and an ethic of respect for life. I prefer not to follow Leidenhag’s
proposal, which makes reference to “pragmatism,” to view the propositions
of scientific naturalism as “attitude-promoting propositions,” that is, as
propositions which we come to adopt since they promote an attitude that is
“pragmatically beneficial” (Leidenhag 2013, 975), but instead to entertain
another pragmatist possibility. I am referring to James’s metaphysics of
experience. The wonder generated by the realization of uncertainty and
ignorance vis-a`-vis nature can be a genuine experience that intimates the
sacred and that has real meaning for people—it can mean the world to
them and affect their behavior (and thus have practical implications)
irrespective of whether the resulting attitudes are “beneficial.”
Arthur Petersen 825
WONDER AND INTIMATIONS OF THE SACRED IN RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES
The emotion of wonder and the metaphysics of experience are also associ-
ated with intimations of the sacred in religious practices. Let me start with
an example from the Judeo-Christian tradition of the recitation or singing
of Psalms. I here pick in particular a Psalm that explicitly stresses wonder
(Psalm 139). The first verses read as follows:
O LORD, thou hast searched me out and known me : thou knowest my
down-sitting and mine up-rising, thou understandest my thoughts long
before.
Thou art about my path, and about my bed : and spiest out all my ways.
For lo, there is not a word in my tongue : but thou, O LORD, knowest it
altogether.
Thou hast fashioned me behind and before : and laid thine hand upon me.
Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me : I cannot attain unto
it.
(Psalm 139:1–6, Coverdale’s translation, Book of Common Prayer)
When such a Psalmmakes part of a liturgical ritual, such as evensong or any
other form of worship or prayer, the narrative (in older Bible versions, such
as the one used above, or in newer Bible versions) can evoke the emotion
of wonder in the worshipper, which it can obviously also do—but often to
a lesser extent—in the private reader. Liturgical ritual can lead people to
‘creep into God’: “‘[C]reeping into God’ is [for most people] something we
must learn. It involves a momentary withdrawal from the natural world so
as to project our thoughts beyond it. That is why special phrases, liturgies
and hallowed language are necessary: they are the guarantee that we are
addressing [an] . . . Other, and not just talking somewhat pompously to
ourselves” (Roger Scruton 2012, 8–9). For different people in different
cultures and religions there are different ways for the “numinous” (Otto
[1917] 1923)—the nonrational (not irrational) dimension of the “holy”
Other—to be experienced. Celia Deane-Drummond (2006) gives the ex-
ample of the importance of silence in liturgy (e.g., in the Eucharist), since
“silence acts like a matrix within which theWord is embedded and through
which a theology of wonder arises” (Deane-Drummond 2006, 140). The
emotion of wonder may be triggered by becoming aware of the breaking
in of the reign of God.
Many more examples may be given, also of other than Christian re-
ligions, but the matter that concerns me here is to illustrate that the
relationships between emotions, the metaphysics of experience and in-
timations of the sacred in religion can be understood from a Jamesian
pragmatist perspective.
It is important to note that according to James there is no general
religious emotion:
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There is religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy, and so
forth. But religious love is only man’s natural emotion of love directed to a
religious object; religious fear is only the ordinary fear of commerce, so to
speak, the common quaking of the human breast, in so far as the notion
of divine retribution may arouse it; religious awe is the same organic thrill
which we feel in a forest at twilight, or in a mountain gorge; only this time
it comes over us at the thought of our supernatural relations; and similarly
of all the various sentiments which may be called into play in the lives of
religious persons. (James [1902] 2012, 30)
As was argued by Carrette (see above), religious emotion has an organic
basis, a cognitive structure and a social dimension, “insofar as the religious
object is shaped in the religious context” (Carrette 2008, 429).
The social dimension is crucial for religious emotion and corresponding
metaphysical experiences and intimations of the sacred. Therefore reli-
gion cannot be confined to the subjective and private domain of personal
experience. While many writers in the tradition of pragmatist philoso-
phy (e.g., Rorty 1997, 85) have interpreted James as having “privatized”
religion, and as thus having resolved the tension between science and reli-
gion as one between “cooperative endeavors” and “private projects,” others
(e.g., Lamberth 1999; Miedema 2002; Carrette 2008) would disagree.
James’s self-assessed “crasser,” or “piecemeal” (as opposed to universalistic)
supernaturalism (James [1902] 2012, 394) includes an inalienable social
dimension. And even though James seems to give primacy to personal reli-
gious experience over the institutional side of religion, I would argue that
religious institutions (such as liturgical ritual) can be regarded as “human
systems evolving in consequence of human needs” (James [1907] 1995,
61).
The sense of wonder—in both religion and science—should not be
considered as merely a cognitive affair, but as involving the whole person
engaged with a community. This sense of wonder is a precious gift that can
be learned—and should preferably not be unlearned—through education,
the primary aim of which, following Miedema, is “directed to the develop-
ment of the whole person, that is, that all domains of human potentiality
and ability—be they cognitive, creative, moral, religious, expressive, or the
like—should be taken into account” (Miedema 2002, 87).
UNCERTAINTY AND GOD
William James offers an alternative to those who are “neither tough [natu-
ralistic] nor tender [monistic] in an extreme and radical sense”:
Between the two extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and tran-
scendental absolutism on the other, you may find that what I take the liberty
of calling the pragmatistic or melioristic type of theism is exactly what you
require. (James [1907] 1995, 116)
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The universe is still in the making. One of the ways humans can realize
that they make the universe is by engaging in science and/or religion.
What those who take up the challenge offered by James will experience is
that they can share their uncertainty and ignorance with their God—who
they can intimate and connect with in a social relation—and share their
suffering.
Theologically, James inspires readings of “omnipotence” and “omni-
science” in which God chooses to be vulnerable and thinks also through
feeling with us (cf. Anastasia Scrutton 2011)—while being both Other
and our inner deep source of hope. Practically, engaging in scientific or
religious practices may create opportunities for individuals to realize that
they are co-creators of the world in partnership with God (who looks to the
world for its cooperation), in full awareness of uncertainty and ignorance
and filled with the emotion of wonder.
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